sábado, 15 de abril de 2017

Científico del MIT de EEUU: Informe de la Casa Blanca sobre ataque de Idleb prueba que éste se preparó en el suelo

Científico norteamericano del MIT: Informe de la Casa Blanca sobre ataque de Idleb prueba que éste se preparó en el suelo

Un científico norteamericano del prestigioso Instituto Tecnológico de Massachusets, Theodore A. Postol, ha asegurado en una rápida evaluación de las evidencias de un informe de inteligencia dado a conocer por la Casa Blanca en relación al ataque químico de Jan Sheijun, y en el que aquella basó sus alegaciones contra el Ejército sirio, que las conclusiones recogidas en tal documento son falsas y un trabajo de aficionados que cualquier profesional de inteligencia desmentiría.

He aquí el escrito del científico publicado por UNZ Review:

Voy a responder a lo que entiendo es una evaluación de la Casa Blanca sobre el ataque con un agente químico ocurrido el 4 de abril de 2017 en la localidad de Jan Sheijun, Siria.

He revisado el documento cuidadosamente y creo que se puede demostrar, sin duda, que él no proporciona ninguna evidencia que pueda suministrar al gobierno de los EEUU un convencimiento de que el gobierno de Siria haya sido el autor del ataque químico en Jan Shaijun,

De hecho, una prueba esencial que se cita en el documento apunta a un ataque que fue ejecutado por individuos en el suelo, y no desde un avión, en la mañana del 4 de abril.

La conclusión (de un ataque aéreo) se basa en una suposición hecha por la Casa Blanca, que fijó el escenario de la liberación del gas sarin y las fotografías de ese escenario. Mi propia evaluación, es que el escenario fue muy probablemente alterado u objeto de una puesta en escena, por lo que no se puede sacar conclusiones serias (de un ataque aéreo) de las fotografías proporcionadas por la Casa Blanca.

Ni siquiera si suponemos, como hace la Casa Blanca, que la liberación del sarin se produjo en este lugar y que la ubicación no fue alterada, la conclusión más plausible es que el sarín fue liberado por un dispositivo de dispersión improvisado consistente en el tubo de un cohete de 122 mm lleno de sarín y tapado por ambos lados.

Los únicos hechos indiscutibles declarados en el informe de la Casa Blanca son la afirmación de que un ataque químico usando agente nervioso ocurrió en Jan Shaijun, Siria, en la mañana del 4 de abril. 

Aunque la declaración de la Casa Blanca repite este punto en muchos lugares de su informe, éste no contiene absolutamente ninguna evidencia de que este ataque fuera el resultado de una munición que fue arrojada desde un avión.

De hecho, el informe no contiene absolutamente ninguna evidencia que indique quién fue el autor de esta atrocidad.

En cambio, el informe repite las observaciones de efectos físicos sufridos por las víctimas que, con muy pocas dudas, apuntan a una intoxicación por agentes nerviosos.

El cráter

El único hecho que el documento cita como evidencia de que el ataque fue realizado por el gobierno sirio es el cráter que afirma haber identificado en un camino en el norte de Jan Sheijun.

He localizado este cráter con Google Earth y no hay absolutamente ninguna evidencia de que fuera creado por una bomba diseñada para dispersar sarín después de ser arrojada desde un avión.

El mapa de Google Earth que se muestra en la Figura 1 al final de esta sección de texto muestra la ubicación de ese cráter en la carretera en el norte de Jan Sheijun, como se describe en el informe de la Casa Blanca.

Los datos citados por la Casa Blanca son más consistentes con la posibilidad de que la munición fuera colocada en el suelo en lugar de caer de un avión. 

Podemos extraer esta conclusión incluso aunque supongamos que el cráter no fue manipulado antes de sacar las fotografías. 

Sin embargo, al referirse a la munición en este cráter, la Casa Blanca concluye erróneamente que la munición que lo produjo provenía de un avión sirio.

El análisis de los escombros, como se muestra en las fotografías citadas por la Casa Blanca, indica claramente, por el contrario, que la munición fue el tubo de un cohete de 122 mm, que fue casi seguramente colocado en el suelo con un explosivo detonante externo colocado sobre él que, al estallar, aplastó el tubo para dispersar la supuesta carga de sarín.

El factor del tiempo

Dado que el tiempo parece ser el punto esencial aquí, he hecho un resumen de las pruebas de que dispongo y que demuestran que el informe de la Casa Blanca contiene conclusiones falsas y engañosas en una serie de cifras que son pertinentes a esta discusión.

La imagen de Google Earth recoge la dirección del viento en la zona del cráter. A las 3 de la mañana el viento iba directamente hacia el sur a una velocidad de aproximadamente 1,5 a 2,5 metros / segundo. 

A las 6 de la mañana el viento se estaba moviendo hacia el sudeste con una velocidad de 1 a 2 m / s. 

La temperatura también era baja, de 50 a 55° F (10 a 12 grados Celsius) cerca del suelo. Estas condiciones son absolutamente ideales para un ataque de agente nervioso.

Cuando la temperatura cerca del suelo es baja, no hay sol y los vientos son muy lentos, el aire fresco denso permanece cerca del suelo y casi no hay movimiento ascendente en el aire. 

Esta condición hacen que las partículas, gotitas o nubes de gas dispersadas permanezcan cerca del suelo mientras que el aire circundante se mueve sobre él. 

Percibimos este movimiento como una brisa suave en una mañana tranquila antes del amanecer.

Uno puede pensar en una nube de sarín en términos iguales a una nube de tinta emitida por un calamar que se escapa. 

La nube de tinta se encuentra en el agua y como el agua se mueve lentamente, lo mismo ocurre con aquella. A medida que la nube se mueve junto con el agua, se extenderá lentamente en todas las direcciones. Si la capa de agua donde se halla la tinta se mueve para permanecer cerca del fondo del océano, la nube cubrirá los objetos mientras se mueve con el agua.

Esta es la situación que ocurre en una noche fría antes del amanecer, cuando los vientos soplan suavemente.

Las figuras 5 y 6 muestran tablas que resumen el clima a intervalos de 3 horas en Jan Sheijun el día del ataque, el 4 de abril así como en el día antes del ataque, el 3 de abril, y el día después del ataque, el 5 de abril. 

Hubo vientos relativamente fuertes en las horas de la mañana del 3 de abril y del 5 de abril. Si el ataque de gas se hubiera ejecutado el día antes o al día siguiente a primera hora de la mañana, habría sido altamente ineficaz. 

Los vientos mucho más fuertes habrían dispersado la nube de agente nervioso y la mezcla de vientos de altitudes más altas habría causado que el agente nervioso fuera llevado a lo alto desde el suelo. Por lo tanto, es absolutamente claro que la hora y el día del ataque fueron cuidadosamente elegidos y esto no fue una casualidad.

El tubo de 122 mm

La Figura 2 muestra una fotografía de alta calidad del cráter identificado en el informe de la Casa Blanca como el lugar desde donde se extendió el gas sarín. Suponiendo que no hubo alteración de evidencias en el cráter, se puede ver lo que la Casa Blanca afirma que fue un dispensador del agente nervioso.

El dispensador se parece a un tubo de 122 mm como el que se utiliza en la fabricación de los cohetes de artillería.

Como se muestra en un primer plano del tubo situado en el cráter, en la Figura 3, éste parece estar sellado originalmente en el extremo frontal y en el extremo posterior. También hay que tener en cuenta que el tubo está aplanado en el cráter, y tiene una fractura que fue generada al ser aplastado desde arriba.

La Figura 4 muestra la posible configuración de un dispositivo de dispersión de sarín improvisado que podría haberse usado para crear el cráter y la carcasa aplastada de lo que fue originalmente un tubo cilíndrico. 

Una buena idea de cómo funcionó este mecanismo de dispersión (de nuevo, asumiendo que el cráter y la carcasa no hubieran sido manipulados, como se supone en el informe de la Casa Blanca) fue que un alto explosivo se colocó sobre un extremo del tubo lleno de sarín y fue detonado.

El explosivo actuó sobre el tubo como un contundente mazo de trituración. Aplastó la tubería contra el suelo mientras creaba el cráter. 

Dado que el tubo estaba lleno de sarín, que es un fluido incompresible, cuando el tubo se aplanó, el sarín actuó sobre las paredes y extremos del mismo causando una grieta a lo largo de su longitud y expulsó el tapón que había en el extremo posterior. 

Este mecanismo de dispersión funciona de la misma forma que si golpeamos un tubo de pasta de dientes con un gran mazo, lo que da lugar a una grieta en el tubo y la salida del tapón de un extremo y la pasta de dientes se dispersaría en muchas direcciones dependiendo de la forma exacta en que se produjera la grieta y la salida del tapón.

Si éste es, de hecho, el mecanismo utilizado para dispersar el sarín, esto indica que el tubo fue colocado en el suelo por individuos y no se trató de una bomba lanzada desde un avión.

Otra mentira, como en 2013

La Figura 8 muestra el dispersador de sarín improvisado junto con un cohete de artillería típico de 122 mm y el cohete de artillería modificado usado en el ataque de sarín del 21 de agosto de 2013 en Damasco.

En aquel momento (30 de agosto de 2013) la Casa Blanca de Obama también emitió un informe de inteligencia que contenía imprecisiones evidentes. 

Por ejemplo, en ese informe se afirmaba inequívocamente que el sarín que estaba contenido en cohetes de artillería utilizados en Damasco había sido lanzado desde las zonas controladas por el gobierno sirio. 

Sin embargo, resultó que la munición particular utilizada en ese ataque tenía un alcance máximo de aproximadamente 2 km, muy lejos de cualquier límite controlado por el gobierno sirio en ese momento.

El informe de la Casa Blanca también contenía otros errores críticos e importantes que podrían describirse correctamente como realizados por aficionados (amateurs). 

Por ejemplo, el informe afirmaba que los lugares de lanzamiento y el impacto de los puntos de los cohetes de artillería fueron observados por los satélites estadounidenses.

Esta afirmación era absolutamente falsa y cualquier analista de inteligencia competente lo habría sabido. 

Los cohetes podían ser vistos desde el Satélite Infrarrojo Basado en el Espacio (SBIRS), pero el satélite no podía ver las ubicaciones de los impactos porque éstos no estuvieron acompañados por explosiones. 

Estos errores eran indicadores claros de que el informe de inteligencia de la Casa Blanca había sido fabricado en parte y no había sido examinado por expertos competentes en inteligencia.

Esta misma situación parece ser el caso del actual informe de inteligencia de la Casa Blanca. 

Ningún analista competente asumiría que el cráter citado como el punto de inicio del ataque con gas sarín era una prueba inequívoca de que la munición química provenía de un avión.

Ningún analista competente asumiría que la fotografía de la carcasa del sarín era de hecho una bomba arrojada desde un avión. 

Cualquier analista competente se habría cuestionado si los escombros en el cráter fueron escenificados o eran reales.

Ningún analista competente dejaría de ver el hecho de que que el tubo que contenía el sarín fue aplastado con fuerza desde arriba, en vez de ser destruido por una explosión que se produjera en su interior. 

Todos estos errores de aficionado indican que este informe de la Casa Blanca, al igual que el anterior informe de la Casa Blanca de Obama, no fue debidamente examinado por la comunidad de inteligencia como se afirmaba.

He trabajado con la comunidad de inteligencia en el pasado y tengo serias preocupaciones acerca de la politización de la inteligencia que parece estar ocurriendo con más frecuencia en los últimos tiempos, pero sé que la comunidad de inteligencia tiene analistas altamente capacitados y competentes. 

Y si esos analistas hubieran sido debidamente consultados en relación a las afirmaciones que aparecen en el documento de la Casa Blanca, no las habrían aprobado.

Estoy disponible para ampliar estos comentarios sustancialmente. Sólo he tenido unas pocas horas para revisar rápidamente el presunto informe de inteligencia de la Casa Blanca. Pero una escueta lectura muestra sin mucho análisis que este informe no puede ser correcto, y también parece que no fue debidamente examinado por la comunidad de inteligencia.

Este es un tema muy serio.

El presidente Obama fue inicialmente mal informado acerca de la supuesta existencia de una evidencia de inteligencia que apuntaba a que Siria era el autor del ataque del agente nervioso del 21 de agosto de 2013 en Damasco. El presidente Obama declaró que su comprensión, inicialmente falsa, estuvo basada en un documento de inteligencia que “claramente demostraba” que el Ejército sirio era el autor del ataque con gas sarín.

Esta falsa información fue corregida cuando el entonces Director de Inteligencia Nacional, James Clapper, interrumpió al Presidente mientras estaba en una reunión de inteligencia. Según el presidente Obama, Clapper dijo que la inteligencia que afirmaba que Siria era el perpetrador del ataque no era “pan comido.”

La pregunta que debe ser respondida a nuestra nación es ¿cómo fue el presidente inicialmente engañado por una información de inteligencia en un tema tan importante? 

Una segunda pregunta igualmente importante es ¿cómo produjo la Casa Blanca un informe de inteligencia que era obviamente defectuoso y amateur y que fue luego publicado y que nunca fue corregido? 

La misma información falsa contenida en el informe de inteligencia emitido por la Casa Blanca el 30 de agosto de 2013 fue enfáticamente repetida por el Secretario de Estado, John Kerry, en un testimonio al Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado.

Hoy en día, tenemos de nuevo una situación en la que la Casa Blanca ha producido y divulgado un informe de inteligencia obviamente falso, engañoso y amateur.

El Congreso y el público recibieron informes en nombre de la comunidad de inteligencia sobre armas de destrucción masiva en Iraq, pruebas técnicas supuestamente recolectadas por sistemas de satélite que cualquier científico competente habría sabido que eran falsas, y ahora reciben conclusiones basadas en fotografías de un cráter que cualquier analista competente desmentiría.




The Nerve Agent Attack in Khan Shaykhun, Syria (w/ Addenda)
A Quick Turnaround Assessment of the White House Intelligence Report Issued on April 11, 2017
Dear Larry:
ViewAsPDF2I am responding to your distribution of what I understand is a White House statement claiming intelligence findings about the nerve agent attack on April 4, 2017 in Khan Shaykhun, Syria. My understanding from your note is that this White House intelligence summary was released to you sometime on April 11, 2017.
I have reviewed the document carefully, and I believe it can be shown, without doubt, that the document does not provide any evidence whatsoever that the US government has concrete knowledge that the government of Syria was the source of the chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun, Syria at roughly 6 to 7 a.m. on April 4, 2017.
In fact, a main piece of evidence that is cited in the document points to an attack that was executed by individuals on the ground, not from an aircraft, on the morning of April 4.
This conclusion is based on an assumption made by the White House when it cited the source of the sarin release and the photographs of that source. My own assessment, is that the source was very likely tampered with or staged, so no serious conclusion could be made from the photographs cited by the White House.
However, if one assumes, as does the White House, that the source of the sarin was from this location and that the location was not tampered with, the most plausible conclusion is that the sarin was dispensed by an improvised dispersal device made from a 122 mm section of rocket tube filled with sarin and capped on both sides.
The only undisputable facts stated in the White House report is the claim that a chemical attack using nerve agent occurred in Khan Shaykhun, Syria on that morning. Although the White House statement repeats this point in many places within its report, the report contains absolutely no evidence that this attack was the result of a munition being dropped from an aircraft. In fact, the report contains absolutely no evidence that would indicate who was the perpetrator of this atrocity.
The report instead repeats observations of physical effects suffered by victims that with very little doubt indicate nerve agent poisoning.
The only source the document cites as evidence that the attack was by the Syrian government is the crater it claims to have identified on a road in the North of Khan Shaykhun.
I have located this crater using Google Earth and there is absolutely no evidence that the crater was created by a munition designed to disperse sarin after it is dropped from an aircraft.
The Google Earth map shown in Figure 1 at the end of this text section shows the location of that crater on the road in the north of Khan Shaykhun, as described in the White House statement.
The data cited by the White House is more consistent with the possibility that the munition was placed on the ground rather than dropped from a plane. This conclusion assumes that the crater was not tampered with prior to the photographs. However, by referring to the munition in this crater, the White House is indicating that this is the erroneous source of the data it used to conclude that the munition came from a Syrian aircraft.
Analysis of the debris as shown in the photographs cited by the White House clearly indicates that the munition was almost certainly placed on the ground with an external detonating explosive on top of it that crushed the container so as to disperse the alleged load of sarin.
Since time appears to be of the essence here, I have put together the summary of the evidence I have that the White House report contains false and misleading conclusions in a series of figures that follow this discussion. Each of the figures has a description below it, but I will summarize these figures next and wait for further inquiries about the basis of the conclusions I am putting forward herein.
Figure 1 shows a Google Earth image of the northeast corner of Khan Shaykhun where the crater identified as the source of the sarin attack and referred to in the White House intelligence report is located.
Also shown in the Google Earth image is the direction of the wind from the crater. At 3 AM the wind was going directly to the south at a speed of roughly 1.5 to 2.5 m/s. By 6 AM the wind was moving to the southeast at 1 to 2 m/s. The temperature was also low, 50 to 55°F near the ground. These conditions are absolutely ideal for a nerve agent attack.
When the temperature near the ground is low, and there is no sun and very slow winds, the dense cool air stays close to the ground and there is almost no upward motion of the air. This condition causes any particles, droplets, or clouds of dispersed gas to stay close to the ground as the surrounding air moves over the ground. We perceive this motion as a gentle breeze on a calm morning before sunrise.
One can think of a cloud of sarin as much like a cloud of ink generated by an escaping octopus. The ink cloud sits in the water and as the water slowly moves, so does the cloud. As the cloud is moved along by the water, it will slowly spread in all directions as it moves. If the layer of water where the ink is embedded moves so as to stay close to the ocean floor, the cloud will cover objects as it moves with the water.
This is the situation that occurs on a cool night before sunrise when the winds move only gently.
Figures 5 and 6 show tables that summarize the weather at 3 hour intervals in Khan Shaykun on the day of the attack, April 4, the day before the attack, April 3, and the day after the attack, April 5. The striking feature of the weather is that there were relatively high winds in the morning hours on both April 3 and April 5. If the gas attack were executed either the day before or the day after in the early morning, the attack would have been highly ineffective. The much higher winds would have dispersed the cloud of nerve agent and the mixing of winds from higher altitudes would have caused the nerve agent to be carried aloft from the ground. It is therefore absolutely clear that the time and day of the attack was carefully chosen and was no accident.
Figure 2 shows a high quality photograph of the crater identified in the White House report as the source of the sarin attack. Assuming that there was no tampering of evidence at the crater, one can see what the White House is claiming as a dispenser of the nerve agent.
The dispenser looks like a 122 mm pipe like that used in the manufacture of artillery rockets.
As shown in the close-up of the pipe in the crater in Figure 3, the pipe looks like it was originally sealed at the front end and the back end. Also of note is that the pipe is flattened into the crater, and also has a fractured seam that was created by the brittle failure of the metal skin when the pipe was suddenly crushed inward from above.
Figure 4 shows the possible configuration of an improvised sarin dispersal device that could have been used to create the crater and the crushed carcass of what was originally a cylindrical pipe. A good guess of how this dispersal mechanism worked (again, assuming that the crater and carcass were not staged, as assumed in the White House report) was that a slab of high explosive was placed over one end of the sarin-filled pipe and detonated.
The explosive acted on the pipe as a blunt crushing mallet. It drove the pipe into the ground while at the same time creating the crater. Since the pipe was filled with sarin, which is an incompressible fluid, as the pipe was flattened the sarin acted on the walls and ends of the pipe causing a crack along the length of the pipe and also the failure of the cap on the back end. This mechanism of dispersal is essentially the same as hitting a toothpaste tube with a large mallet, which then results in the tube failing and the toothpaste being blown in many directions depending on the exact way the toothpaste skin ruptures.
If this is in fact the mechanism used to disperse the sarin, this indicates that the sarin tube was placed on the ground by individuals on the ground and not dropped from an airplane.
Figure 8 shows the improvised sarin dispenser along with a typical 122 mm artillery rocket and the modified artillery rocket used in the sarin attack of August 21, 2013 in Damascus.
At that time (August 30, 2013) the Obama White House also issued an intelligence report containing obvious inaccuracies. For example, that report stated without equivocation that the sarin carrying artillery rocket used in Damascus had been fired from Syrian government controlled areas. As it turned out, the particular munition used in that attack could not go further than roughly 2 km, very far short of any boundary controlled by the Syrian government at that time. The White House report at that time also contained other critical and important errors that might properly be described as amateurish. For example, the report claimed that the locations of the launch and impact of points of the artillery rockets were observed by US satellites. This claim was absolutely false and any competent intelligence analyst would have known that. The rockets could be seen from the Space-Based Infrared Satellite (SBIRS) but the satellite could absolutely not see the impact locations because the impact locations were not accompanied by explosions. These errors were clear indicators that the White House intelligence report had in part been fabricated and had not been vetted by competent intelligence experts.
This same situation appears to be the case with the current White House intelligence report. No competent analyst would assume that the crater cited as the source of the sarin attack was unambiguously an indication that the munition came from an aircraft. No competent analyst would assume that the photograph of the carcass of the sarin canister was in fact a sarin canister. Any competent analyst would have had questions about whether the debris in the crater was staged or real. No competent analyst would miss the fact that the alleged sarin canister was forcefully crushed from above, rather than exploded by a munition within it. All of these highly amateurish mistakes indicate that this White House report, like the earlier Obama White House Report, was not properly vetted by the intelligence community as claimed.
I have worked with the intelligence community in the past, and I have grave concerns about the politicization of intelligence that seems to be occurring with more frequency in recent times – but I know that the intelligence community has highly capable analysts in it. And if those analysts were properly consulted about the claims in the White House document they would have not approved the document going forward.
I am available to expand on these comments substantially. I have only had a few hours to quickly review the alleged White House intelligence report. But a quick perusal shows without a lot of analysis that this report cannot be correct, and it also appears that this report was not properly vetted by the intelligence community.
This is a very serious matter.
President Obama was initially misinformed about supposed intelligence evidence that Syria was the perpetrator of the August 21, 2013 nerve agent attack in Damascus. This is a matter of public record. President Obama stated that his initially false understanding was that the intelligence clearly showed that Syria was the source of the nerve agent attack. This false information was corrected when the then Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, interrupted the President while he was in an intelligence briefing. According to President Obama, Mr. Clapper told the President that the intelligence that Syria was the perpetrator of the attack was “not a slamdunk.”
The question that needs to be answered by our nation is how was the president initially misled about such a profoundly important intelligence finding? A second equally important question is how did the White House produce an intelligence report that was obviously flawed and amateurish that was then released to the public and never corrected? The same false information in the intelligence report issued by the White House on August 30, 2013 was emphatically provided by Secretary of State John Kerry in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee!
We again have a situation where the White House has issued an obviously false, misleading and amateurish intelligence report.
The Congress and the public have been given reports in the name of the intelligence community about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, technical evidence supposedly collected by satellite systems that any competent scientists would know is false, and now from photographs of the crater that any analyst who has any competent at all would not trust as evidence.
It is late in the evening for me, so I will end my discussion here.
I stand ready to provide the country with any analysis and help that is within my power to supply. What I can say for sure herein is that what the country is now being told by the White House cannot be true and the fact that this information has been provided in this format raises the most serious questions about the handling of our national security.
Sincerely yours,
Theodore A. Postol
Professor Emeritus of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Email: postol@mit.edu
Cell Phone: 617 543-7646

Figures and Diagrams

Direction of lethal Plume on April 4, 2017 between 3 and 6 AM on April 4, 2017 assuming the munition crater identified by the White House report is actually a sarin dispersal site.
Direction of lethal Plume on April 4, 2017 between 3 and 6 AM on April 4, 2017 assuming the munition crater identified by the White House report is actually a sarin dispersal site.
Figure 1

Close up photograph of the crater that has been shown in numerous mainstream media publications that the White House alleges is proof that the source of the nerve agent attack was the Syrian government.
Close up photograph of the crater that has been shown in numerous mainstream media publications that the White House alleges is proof that the source of the nerve agent attack was the Syrian government.
Figure 2

Deformation of sarin containing pipe and crater from the action of the explosive charge placed on top of the sarin containing pipe. Note that pipe has been flattened from the outside and has failed along its length and at the far end due to the action of the incompressible sarin fluid against the pipe walls.
Deformation of sarin containing pipe and crater from the action of the explosive charge placed on top of the sarin containing pipe. Note that pipe has been flattened from the outside and has failed along its length and at the far end due to the action of the incompressible sarin fluid against the pipe walls.
Figure 3

Possible configuration of an improvised sarin dispersal device that uses an externally placed explosive and a sealed pipe that has been filled with sarin that could potentially contain 8 to 10 L of sarin.
Possible configuration of an improvised sarin dispersal device that uses an externally placed explosive and a sealed pipe that has been filled with sarin that could potentially contain 8 to 10 L of sarin.
Figure 4

The weather at the time of the attack was ideal for the most lethal spread of the nerve agent. The ground was cool and there was a high density layer of air near the ground that would carry the nerve agent close to the ground as it drifted towards its victims. The wind speed was also very low, which resulted in the sarin taking a long time to pass over its victims, resulting in long exposures that made it more likely that victims would get a lethal dose.
The weather at the time of the attack was ideal for the most lethal spread of the nerve agent. The ground was cool and there was a high density layer of air near the ground that would carry the nerve agent close to the ground as it drifted towards its victims. The wind speed was also very low, which resulted in the sarin taking a long time to pass over its victims, resulting in long exposures that made it more likely that victims would get a lethal dose.
Figure 5

The weather on the day before the attack, Monday April 3, and on the day after the attack, Wednesday April 5, had very poor weather for an effective nerve agent attack. The winds were high and gusty on both days, which would have resulted in the sarin being carried away from the ground and quickly over any possible victims, causing a very limited time for them to get a dose that would be lethal.
The weather on the day before the attack, Monday April 3, and on the day after the attack, Wednesday April 5, had very poor weather for an effective nerve agent attack. The winds were high and gusty on both days, which would have resulted in the sarin being carried away from the ground and quickly over any possible victims, causing a very limited time for them to get a dose that would be lethal.
Figure 6

How the sarin is dispersed by the wind: the graph above shows a rough estimate of how a cloud of sarin droplets might disperse under weather conditions similar to that in the early morning on April 4, 2017 in Khan Shaykhun. As the sarin is carried by the ambient winds, it tends to rise and spread somewhat due to the slight turbulence of the air. Note that the cloud might not disperse much for ranges of thousands of meters downwind. The cross range and vertical dispersion is determined not only by the weather conditions but also by the ground, which if rough could increase the dispersion and if flat and smooth could reduce the dispersion.
How the sarin is dispersed by the wind: the graph above shows a rough estimate of how a cloud of sarin droplets might disperse under weather conditions similar to that in the early morning on April 4, 2017 in Khan Shaykhun. As the sarin is carried by the ambient winds, it tends to rise and spread somewhat due to the slight turbulence of the air. Note that the cloud might not disperse much for ranges of thousands of meters downwind. The cross range and vertical dispersion is determined not only by the weather conditions but also by the ground, which if rough could increase the dispersion and if flat and smooth could reduce the dispersion.
Figure 7

The ground-placed improvised sarin dispersal device is shown next to a standard 122 mm artillery rocket and the modified rocket that was used for delivering sarin in the nerve agent attack of August 21, 2013. Unlike the modified artillery rockets used in the nerve agent attack of August 21, 2013 in Damascus, this particular improvised dispersal device is simply a section of pipe from a 122 mm rocket or for the manufacture of 122 mm rockets that could have been filled with sarin. The explosive placed on top of the pipe would cause it to be suddenly crushed up like a tube of toothpaste hit by a mallet. Just as the toothpaste would be sprayed out from the toothpaste tube, so with the sarin be sprayed from the metal tube.
The ground-placed improvised sarin dispersal device is shown next to a standard 122 mm artillery rocket and the modified rocket that was used for delivering sarin in the nerve agent attack of August 21, 2013. Unlike the modified artillery rockets used in the nerve agent attack of August 21, 2013 in Damascus, this particular improvised dispersal device is simply a section of pipe from a 122 mm rocket or for the manufacture of 122 mm rockets that could have been filled with sarin. The explosive placed on top of the pipe would cause it to be suddenly crushed up like a tube of toothpaste hit by a mallet. Just as the toothpaste would be sprayed out from the toothpaste tube, so with the sarin be sprayed from the metal tube.
Figure 8

Rough estimate of possible sarin densities and times to lethal exposure from the improvised sarin dispersal device described in the White House report and exploded on the road in Khan Shaykhun.
Rough estimate of possible sarin densities and times to lethal exposure from the improvised sarin dispersal device described in the White House report and exploded on the road in Khan Shaykhun.
Figure 8

Addendum to Original Assessment Report

ViewAsPDF2This addendum is a follow-up to the report A Quick Turnaround Assessment of the White House Intelligence Report Issued on April 11, 2017 about the Nerve Agent Attack in Khan Shaykhun, Syria. The full “Quick Turnaround” was written on the evening of April 11 after a quick review of the White House Intelligence Report (WHR) issued on the same day.
This addendum provides data that unambiguously shows that the assumption in the WHR that there was no tampering with the alleged site of the sarin release is not correct. This egregious error raises questions about every other claim in the WHR.
As noted in the main body of my earlier report, the assumption in WHR that the site of the alleged sarin release had not been tampered with was totally unjustified and no competent intelligence analyst would have agreed that this assumption was valid. The implication of this observation is clear – the WHR was not reviewed and released by any competent intelligence expert unless they were motivated by factors other than concerns about the accuracy of the report.
The WHR also makes claims about “communications intercepts” which supposedly provide high confidence that the Syrian government was the source of the attack. There is no reason to believe that the veracity of this claim is any different from the now verified false claim that there was unambiguous evidence of a sarin release at the cited crater.
The White House intelligence report states that:
The United States is confident that the Syrian regime conducted a chemical weapons attack, using the nerve agent sarin.
It also contains additional assertions that were key elements for underpinning its claim of a high confidence assessment:
We have confidence in our assessment because we have signals intelligence and geospatial intelligence, laboratory analysis of physiological samples collected from multiple victims, as well as a significant body of credible open source reporting, that tells a clear and consistent story.
An open source video also shows where we believe the chemical munition landed—not on a facility filled with weapons, but in the middle of a street in the northern section of Khan Shaykhun[Emphasis Added]. Commercial satellite imagery of that site from April 6, after the allegation, shows a crater in the road that corresponds to the open source video.
… observed munition remnants at the crater and staining around the impact point are consistent with a munition that functioned.
Last November, for instance, senior Russian officials used an image from a widely publicized regime chemical weapons attack in 2013 on social media platforms to publicly allege chemical weapons use by the opposition.
The evidence that unambiguously shows that the assumption that the sarin release crater was tampered with is contained in six photographs at the end of this document.
Figure A-1 shows a man standing in the alleged sarin-release crater. He is wearing a honeycomb facemask that is designed to filter small particles from the air. Other apparel on him is an open necked cloth shirt and what appear to be medical exam gloves.
Two other men are standing in front of him (on the left in the photograph) also wearing honeycomb facemask’s and medical exam gloves.
If there were any sarin present at this location when this photograph was taken everybody in the photograph would have received a lethal or debilitating dose of sarin.
The fact that these people were dressed so inadequately either suggests a complete ignorance of the basic measures needed to protect an individual from sarin poisoning, or that they knew that the site was not seriously contaminated.
This is the crater that is the centerpiece evidence provided in the WHR for a sarin attack delivered by a Syrian aircraft.
Figure A-2 shows the location of the crater on a Google Earth map of the Northeast part of Khan Sheikun. The white arrow labeled camera direction indicates the bore site of the camera when the photograph was taken. The white dot connected to a line shows the approximate location of the camera when the photo was taken. The direction the camera is looking is North Northeast.
Figure A-3 shows a photograph of the same street and crater when it is unoccupied by people. This photograph is taken from a slightly greater distance away from the crater but the bore site of the camera is in the same direction – North Northeast.
Figure A-4 shows the crater, probably shortly after the tampering occurred that is documented in Figure A-1.
The camera bore site is downward into the crater and its azimuth is roughly East Northeast. Note that the surgical gloves that can be seen on the ground behind the man in the crater in Figure A-1 can be seen almost unmoved in the photograph shown in Figure A-4. This strongly suggests that the photograph was taken a relatively short time after the tampering occurred.
Figure A-5 shows the crater at a time that may have been before the tampering occurred. The bottom of the crater looks rather different and the piece of pipe, which is clearly lying on top of the bottom of the crater in Figure A-4, now appears to be partially buried. The photograph in Figure A-5 is taken with the bore site of the camera looking roughly west.
Figure A-6 shows a photograph of the crater, probably taken at about the same time as the photo in Figure A-5, with the azimuth of the bore site of the camera looking Southwest.
Summary and Conclusions from the Data
We repeat here a quote from the WHR:
An open source video also shows where we believe the chemical munition landed—not on a facility filled with weapons, but in the middle of a street in the northern section of Khan Shaykhun[Emphasis Added]. Commercial satellite imagery of that site from April 6, after the allegation, shows a crater in the road that corresponds to the open source video.
The data provided in these photographs make it clear that the WHR made no serious attempt to collect data that would support its “confident assessment” that there was data to unambiguously support a conclusion that the Syrian government executed a sarin attack as indicated by the location and characteristics of the crater. This does not appear to be a mistake.
It is hard for me to believe that anybody competent could have been involved in producing the WHR report and the implications of such an obviously predetermined result strongly suggests that this report was not motivated by a serious analysis of any kind.
This finding is disturbing. It indicates that the WHR was probably a report purely aimed at justifying actions that were not supported by any legitimate intelligence.
This is not a unique situation. President George W. Bush has argued that he was misinformed about unambiguous evidence that Iraq was hiding a substantial amount of weapons of mass destruction. This false intelligence led to a US attack on Iraq that started a process that ultimately led to a political disintegration in the Middle East, which through a series of unpredicted events then led to the rise of the Islamic State. On August 30, 2013, the White House produced a similarly false report about the nerve agent attack on August 21, 2013 in Damascus. This report also contained numerous intelligence claims that could not be true. An interview with President Obama published in The Atlantic in April 2016 indicates that Obama was initially told that there was solid intelligence that the Syrian government was responsible for the nerve agent attack of August 21, 2013 in Ghouta, Syria. Obama reported that he was later told that the intelligence was not solid by the then Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper.
Equally serious questions are raised about the abuse of intelligence findings by the incident in 2013. Questions that have not been answered about that incident is how the White House produced a false intelligence report with false claims that could obviously be identified by experts outside the White House and without access to classified information. There also needs to be an explanation of why this 2013 false report was not corrected. Secretary of State John Kerry emphatically testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee repeating information in this so-called un-equivocating report.
On August 30, 2013 Secretary of State Kerry made the following statement from the Treaty Room in the State Department:
Our intelligence community has carefully reviewed and re-reviewed information regarding this attack [Emphasis added], and I will tell you it has done so more than mindful of the Iraq experience. We will not repeat that moment. Accordingly, we have taken unprecedented steps to declassify and make facts available to people who can judge for themselves.
It is now obvious that a second incident similar to what happened in the Obama administration has now occurred in the Trump administration.
In this case, the president, supported by his staff, made a decision to launch 59 cruise missiles at a Syrian air base. This action was accompanied by serious risks of creating a confrontation with Russia, and also undermining cooperative efforts to win the war against the Islamic State.
Prior to these two inexplicable false intelligence reports, we had the incident in the Bush administration that led us to make decisions that we are still trying to deal with today.
I therefore conclude that there needs to be a comprehensive investigation of these events that have either misled people in the White House White House, or worse yet, been perpetrated by people seeking to force decisions that were not justified by the cited intelligence.
This is a serious matter and should not be allowed to continue.
Figures and Diagrams
Figure A-1

Figure A-2

Figure A-3

Figure A-4

Figure A-5

Figure A-6

_

Appendix: Quotes from the White House Report

The United States is confident that the Syrian regime conducted a chemical weapons attack, using the nerve agent sarin
We have confidence in our assessment because we have signals intelligence and geospatial intelligence, laboratory analysis of physiological samples collected from multiple victims, as well as a significant body of credible open source reporting, that tells a clear and consistent story.
We assess that Damascus launched this chemical attack in response to an opposition offensive in northern Hamah Province that threatened key infrastructure. Senior regime military leaders were probably involved in planning the attack.
Shaykhun at 6:55 AM local time on April 4
Our information indicates that the chemical agent was delivered by regime Su-22 fixed-wing aircraft our information indicates personnel historically associated with Syria’s chemical weapons program were at Shayrat Airfield in late March making preparations for an upcoming attack in Northern Syria, and they were present at the airfield on the day of the attack.
Hours after the April 4 attack, there were hundreds of accounts of victims presenting symptoms consistent with sarin exposure,
Commercial satellite imagery from April 6 showed impact craters around the hospital that are consistent with open source reports of a conventional attack on the hospital after the chemical attack. An open source video also shows where we believe the chemical munition landed—not on a facility filled with weapons, but in the middle of a street in the northern section of Khan Shaykhun. Commercial satellite imagery of that site from April 6, after the allegation, shows a crater in the road that corresponds to the open source video.
observed munition remnants at the crater and staining around the impact point are consistent with a munition that functioned
Last November, for instance, senior Russian officials used an image from a widely publicized regime chemical weapons attack in 2013 on social media platforms to publicly allege chemical weapons use by the opposition.
We must remember that the Assad regime failed to adhere to its international obligations after its devastating attacks on Damascus suburbs using the nerve agent sarin in August 2013, which resulted in more than one thousand civilian fatalities, many of whom were children. The regime agreed at that time to fully dismantle its chemical weapons program, but this most recent attack

Appendix: White House Intelligence Report Provided to Me on April 11, 2017

The Assad Regime’s Use of Chemical Weapons on April 4, 2017
The United States is confident that the Syrian regime conducted a chemical weapons attack, using the nerve agent sarin, against its own people in the town of Khan Shaykhun in southern Idlib Province on April 4, 2017. According to observers at the scene, the attack resulted in at least 50 and up to 100 fatalities (including many children), with hundreds of additional injuries.
We have confidence in our assessment because we have signals intelligence and geospatial intelligence, laboratory analysis of physiological samples collected from multiple victims, as well as a significant body of credible open source reporting, that tells a clear and consistent story. We cannot publicly release all available intelligence on this attack due to the need to protect sources and methods, but the following includes an unclassified summary of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s analysis of this attack.
Summary of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Assessment of the April 4 Attack
The Syrian regime maintains the capability and intent to use chemical weapons against the opposition to prevent the loss of territory deemed critical to its survival. We assess that Damascus launched this chemical attack in response to an opposition offensive in northern Hamah Province that threatened key infrastructure. Senior regime military leaders were probably involved in planning the attack.
A significant body of pro-opposition social media reports indicate that the chemical attack began in Khan Shaykhun at 6:55 AM local time on April 4.
Our information indicates that the chemical agent was delivered by regime Su-22 fixed-wing aircraft that took off from the regime-controlled Shayrat Airfield. These aircraft were in the vicinity of Khan Shaykhun approximately 20 minutes before reports of the chemical attack began and vacated the area shortly after the attack. Additionally, our information indicates personnel historically associated with Syria’s chemical weapons program were at Shayrat Airfield in late March making preparations for an upcoming attack in Northern Syria, and they were present at the airfield on the day of the attack.
Hours after the April 4 attack, there were hundreds of accounts of victims presenting symptoms consistent with sarin exposure, such as frothing at the nose and mouth, twitching, and pinpoint pupils. This constellation of symptoms is inconsistent with exposure to a respiratory irritant like chlorine— which the regime has also used in attacks—and is extremely unlikely to have resulted from a conventional attack because of the number of victims in the videos and the absence of other visible injuries. Open source accounts posted following the attack reported that first responders also had difficulty breathing, and that some lost consciousness after coming into contact with the victims— consistent with secondary exposure to nerve agent.
By 12:15 PM local time, broadcasted local videos included images of dead children of varying ages. Accounts of a hospital being bombed began to emerge at 1:10 PM local, with follow-on videos showing the bombing of a nearby hospital that had been flooded with victims of the sarin attack. Commercial satellite imagery from April 6 showed impact craters around the hospital that are consistent with open source reports of a conventional attack on the hospital after the chemical attack. Later on April 4, local physicians posted videos specifically pointing out constricted pupils (a telltale symptom of nerve agent exposure), medical staff with body suits on, and treatments involving atropine, which is an antidote for nerve agents such as sarin
We are certain that the opposition could not have fabricated all of the videos and other reporting of chemical attacks. Doing so would have required a highly organized campaign to deceive multiple media outlets and human rights organizations while evading detection. In addition, we have independently confirmed that some of the videos were shot at the approximate times and locations described in the footage.
Further, the World Health Organization stated on April 5 that its analysis of the victims of the attack in Syria showed they had been exposed to nerve agents, citing the absence of external injuries and deaths due to suffocation. Doctors without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres; MSF) said that medical teams treating affected patients found symptoms to be consistent with exposure to a neurotoxic agent such as sarin. And Amnesty International said evidence pointed to an air-launched chemical attack. Subsequent laboratory analysis of physiological samples collected from multiple victims detected signatures of the nerve agent sarin.
Refuting the False Narratives
The Syrian regime and its primary backer, Russia, have sought to confuse the world community about who is responsible for using chemical weapons against the Syrian people in this and earlier attacks. Initially, Moscow dismissed the allegations of a chemical weapons attack in Khan Shaykhun, claiming the attack was a “prank of a provocative nature” and that all evidence was fabricated. It is clear, however, that the Syrian opposition could not manufacture this quantity and variety of videos and other reporting from both the attack site and medical facilities in Syria and Turkey while deceiving both media observers and intelligence agencies.
Moscow has since claimed that the release of chemicals was caused by a regime airstrike on a terrorist ammunition depot in the eastern suburbs of Khan Shaykhun. However, a Syrian military source told Russian state media on April 4 that regime forces had not carried out any airstrike in Khan Shaykhun, contradicting Russia’s claim. An open source video also shows where we believe the chemical munition landed—not on a facility filled with weapons, but in the middle of a street in the northern section of Khan Shaykhun. Commercial satellite imagery of that site from April 6, after the allegation, shows a crater in the road that corresponds to the open source video.
Moscow has suggested that terrorists had been using the alleged ammunition depot to produce and store shells containing toxic gas that they then used in Iraq, adding that both Iraq and international organizations have confirmed the use of such weapons by militants. While it is widely accepted that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has repeatedly used sulfur mustard on the battlefield, there are no indications that ISIS was responsible for this incident or that the attack involved chemicals in ISIS’s possession.
Moscow suggested this airstrike occurred between 11:30 AM and 12:30 PM local time on April 4, disregarding that allegations first appeared on social media close to 7:00 AM local time that morning, when we know regime aircraft were operating over Khan Shaykhun. In addition, observed munition remnants at the crater and staining around the impact point are consistent with a munition that functioned, but structures nearest to the impact crater did not sustain damage that would be expected from a conventional high-explosive payload. Instead, the damage is more consistent with a chemical munition.
The Syrian regime has used other chemical agents in attacks against civilians in opposition held areas in the past, including the use of sulfur mustard in Aleppo in late 2016. Russia has alleged that video footage from April 4 indicated that victims from this attack showed the same symptoms of poisoning as victims in Aleppo last fall, implying that something other than a nerve agent was used in Khan Shaykhun. However, victims of the attack on April 4 displayed tell-tale symptoms of nerve agent exposure, including pinpoint pupils, foaming at the nose and mouth, and twitching, all of which are inconsistent with exposure to sulfur mustard.
Russia’s allegations fit with a pattern of deflecting blame from the regime and attempting to undermine the credibility of its opponents. Russia and Syria, in multiple instances since mid- 2016, have blamed the opposition for chemical use in attacks. Yet similar to the Russian narrative for the attack on Khan Shaykhun, most Russian allegations have lacked specific or credible information. Last November, for instance, senior Russian officials used an image from a widely publicized regime chemical weapons attack in 2013 on social media platforms to publicly allege chemical weapons use by the opposition. In May 2016, Russian officials made a similar claim using an image from a video game. In October 2016, Moscow also claimed terrorists used chlorine and white phosphorus in Aleppo, even though pro-Russian media footage from the attack site showed no sign of chlorine use. In fact, our Intelligence from the same day suggests that neither of Russia’s accounts was accurate and that the regime may have mistakenly used chlorine on its own forces. Russia’s contradictory and erroneous reports appear to have been intended to confuse the situation and to obfuscate on behalf of the regime.
Moscow’s allegations typically have been timed to distract the international community from Syria’s ongoing use of chemical weapons—such as the claims earlier this week—or to counter the findings from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations (UN) Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), which confirmed in August and October 2016 reports that the Syrian regime has continued to use chemical weapons on multiple occasions long after it committed to relinquish its arsenal in 2013. Russia has also questioned the impartial findings of the JIM—a body that Russia helped to establish—and was even willing to go so far as to suggest that the Assad regime should investigate itself for the use of chemical weapons.
Moscow’s response to the April 4 attack follows a familiar pattern of its responses to other egregious actions; it spins out multiple, conflicting accounts in order to create confusion and sow doubt within the international community.
International Condemnation and a Time for Action
The Assad regime’s brutal use of chemical weapons is unacceptable and poses a clear threat to the national security interests of the United States and the international community. Use of weapons of mass destruction by any actor lowers the threshold for others that may seek to follow suit and raises the possibility that they may be used against the United States, our allies or partners, or any other nation around the world.
The United States calls on the world community in the strongest possible terms to stand with us in making an unambiguous statement that this behavior will not be tolerated. This is a critical moment— we must demonstrate that subterfuge and false facts hold no weight, that excuses by those shielding their allies are making the world a more dangerous place, and that the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons will not be permitted to continue. We must remember that the Assad regime failed to adhere to its international obligations after its devastating attacks on Damascus suburbs using the nerve agent sarin in August 2013, which resulted in more than one thousand civilian fatalities, many of whom were children. The regime agreed at that time to fully dismantle its chemical weapons program, but this most recent attack—like others before it—are proof that it has not done so. To be clear, Syria has violated its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the UN Charter, and no drumbeat of nonsensical claims by the regime or its allies can hide this truth. And while it is an embarrassment that Russia has vetoed multiple UN Security Council resolutions that could have helped rectify the situation, the United States intends to send a clear message now that we and our partners will not allow the world to become a more dangerous place due to the egregious acts of the Assad regime.

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Si nos han de robar, 
que sean otros y no los mismos de siempre

Si como votantes, no nos escuchan
como consumidores, lo harán
boicoetemos sus empresas.
Llevamos las de ganar. 

Como acabar con la ESTAFA de las ELÉCTRICAS... de una puta vez pasando de los Vendepatrias del Bipartidismo

Ante el robo continuo y escandaloso por parte de las eléctricas y sus abusos en el recibo de la luz
propongo... 
actuar todos unidos como consumidores
contratando TODOS 
o en su defecto una gran mayoría,
  otra compañia eléctrica que no sea ninguna de estas dos (ENDESA - IBERDROLA) y cambiarnos a otra cualquiera de las muchas ofertas que existen hoy en día.

De tal forma que no les quede otra a las grandes que plegarse a nuestras demandas de una tarifa más justa y mucho más barata
o atenerse a las consecuencias 
de seguir con su estafa.

En nuestra mano está que siga este robo o cortar por lo sano para que no nos sigan mangoneando

ARMAK de ODELOT

Canción del Indignado Global

(solo pá Mentes preclaras 

libres de Polvo y Cargas)

Si me han de matar que sea,
 un Trump que de frente va

  no un Obama traicionero, 

que me venga por detrás.


Éstos del bipartidismo, 

a nadie ya se la dan

Tanto monta, monta tanto,

ser sociata o liberal.


Que harto me tienen sus cuentos, 

de crisis y guerras sin más

Cuando no hay bandera que tape, 

la ansia de un criminal.


Daños colaterales son, 

inocentes masacrar

si lo hiciéramos con ellos, 

no habría ni una guerra más.


Por eso pasa que pasa, 

que nadie se alista ya

a no ser que la CIA pague,
 
como al ISIS del MOSAD


A mí, que nunca me busquen, 

ni me llamen pá luchar.

Que yo no mato por nadie. 

Yo mato por no matar.


La paz de los cementerios 

es la paz del capital

Si soy rojo es porque quiero, 

en vida, vivir en paz.


Hoy tan solo mata el hambre, 

del rico por tener más 

Con el cómplice silencio, 

de toítos los demás.


Que preferimos taparnos, 

los ojos pá no pensar

O mirar pá otro lado, 

pensando que el mal se irá.


Creer que lo que a otro pasa, 

no nos tiene que importar.

Cá palo aguante su vela, 

repetimos sin cesar.


Éste es el mantra egoísta 

que rula por la sociedad

como si lo que le pase a otro, 

no te pueda a tí pasar


Más todo, cuán boomerang vuelve, 

al sitio de donde partió

y tal vez ocupes mañana, 

el sitio que otro dejó.


Mil pobres ceban a un rico, 

otros mil le dan jornal,

y otros cuantos dan su vida 

porque todo siga igual. 


Que no me coman la oreja, 

que no me creo ya ná

de sus guerras, sus estafas, 

ni su calentamiento global


Tan solo vuestras mentiras, 

esconden una verdad

que unos pocos están arriba 

y abajo tós los demás.


Da igual que seas ateo, 

cristiano o musulmán.

Solo los elegidos, 

el paraíso verán.


Hay medios alternativos, 

amarillos muchos más.

Unos más rojos que otros. 

Los menos, de radikal.


Más todos tienen su cosa, 

y a todos hay que hojear

Que comparando se tiene 

opinión más general.


Qué de tó aprende uno. 

Nadie tiene la verdad.

Ser más papista que el Papa, 

no es garantía de ná.


Solo creo en lo que veo, 

díjome santo Tomás, 

que el que a ciegas se conduce, 

no para de tropezar.


Y al enemigo, ni agua, 

ni nunca contemporizar

No dudes, tarde o temprano, 

siempre te la jugará.


No hay que seguir a nadie 

y a todos hay que escuchar.

Si tu conciencia te guía, 

de nada te arrepentirás.


Dá gusto ver a los ricos, 

pegarse por serlo más

mientras en eso se hallen, 

quizás nos dejen en paz.


Si te crees o no sus mentiras, 

a ellos les dá igual.

Con tomarlas por veraces, 

les basta para actuar. 


Que no me cuenten más cuentos, 

que tós me los sé yo ya.

Se demoniza a cualquiera

que no se deje robar.



No basta con ser un santo, 

sino ser de"su santoral"

Como la cojan contigo, 

no te valdrá ni el rezar.


Pensamiento único llaman. 

Anteojeras pá no pensar

más que en la zanahoria. 

El palo irá por detrás.


Si no crees en lo dictado, 

anti-sistema serás

Y por mucho bien que hagas, 

te van a demonizar.


Que no me coman la oreja, 

que a mí, no me la dan.

Que me sé todos sus cuentos 

y también, cada final.


Si de cañon, quieren carne, 

pál matadero llevar

que busquen a otro tonto, 

que este tonto no va más



No se ha visto en tóa la historia, 

otra estafa sin igual.

Que la madre tóas las crisis, 

que creó el capital


Y cuando tan ricamente, 

uno estaba en su sofá

Relajado y a cubierto, 

de inclemencias y demás,


te cortan sin previo aviso

el grifo de tu maná. 


Y te dejan sin tus sueños,
 
sin trabajo y sin hogar


y pá colmo y regodeo 

de propios y extraños, van

y te dicen como aviso

que al rojo no hay que escuchar


que son peores que el lobo,

del cuento y mucho más

y que si vas y los votas

toíto te lo robarán.



Si como votantes, no nos escuchan

como consumidores lo harán.

Boicoetemos sus empresas

Llevamos las de ganar. 


Si no queda más remedio

que dejarnos de robar

que sea otro y no el de siempre

tal vez así, aprenderá


No hay pan pá tanto chorizo,

dicen, cuando lo que sobra es pan.

Lo que no hay es un par de huevos
 
pá que no nos choriceen más.


Resultado de imagen de eladio fernandez refugiados suecia

Ellos tienen de tó

los demás, cuasi-de-ná

mas ellos son cuatro mierdas

y nosotros sémos más.


La próxima revolución 

contra las corporaciones será

y si ésta no se gana 

no habrá ninguna ya más.

Quien sepa entender que entienda

lo que digo es pá mascar

despacio y con buena conciencia.

Mi tiempo no dá... pá más


Armak de Odelot


Dicen: 

No será televisada, 

la próxima revolución.

Más como nadie se fía 

de lo que se nos dice hoy en día,

pasamos los días enteros, 

tumbados en el sofá

delante la caja tonta,

 por no perder el momento
del pase de la procesión 
que tós llevamos por dentro